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EVALUATING PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS
IN AN INCOME TAX-THE IDEAL
William J. Turniert
The dynamics of the political process have produced an in-
come tax structure sharply at variance with the system that most
tax theorists would design. Nonetheless, in recent years theoretical
studies of tax reform have had an increasing impact on political
discussions dealing with basic tax reform. Much of the theoretical
discussion has emanated from those who advocate a comprehen-
sive tax base and the tax expenditure budget.
The role of personal deductions in our income tax system
has generated considerable debate among individuals who have
criticized personal deductions as unwarranted erosions of the tax
base.' Implicit in this criticism is the view that the government
should tax all income. These critics commonly characterize per-
sonal deductions as subsidies for the wealthy that Congress,
through tax reform legislation, should eliminate.2 Underlying
this approach is the assumption that all deductions stem from the
economic self-interest of politically powerful groups.3  Personal
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Virginia; member of the New York Bar. The author wishes to acknowledge the encour-
agement in the use of historical materials given him by Jacob L. Talmon, a great scholar
and an even greater friend, who unfortunately will never read these words.
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I See, e.g., R. FREEMAN, TAX LOOPHOLES: THE LEGEND AND THE REALITY (1973) CoM-
PREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION (I. Pechman ed. 1977); P. STERN, THE GREAT TREASURY
RAID (1964); S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); Aaron, What is a Comprehensive
Tax Base Anyway?, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 543 (1969); Brown, Towards Equity and Efficiency in
Federal Taxation, 36 U. PITT. L. REV. 835 (1975); Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure
Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT. TAX J. 528 (1969).
This critical view of personal deductions appears in the annual tax expenditure
budget and the Canadian White Paper and, to a lesser extent, in the Treasury's blueprints
for tax reform. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1980 183 (1979); ROYAL COMMISSION ON
TAXATION, REPORT (1966); U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM
(1977).
2 See, e.g., R. FREEMAN, supra note I, at 13; S. SURREY supra note 1, at 37.
3 Professor Surrey, who has made a major contribution to the debate over tax reform
by advocating the development of a expenditure budget, has always suggested that even if
deductions erode the income tax base, additional factors may still justify deductions. See S.
SURREY, supra note 1, at 31. Unfortunately, much of the discussion of these additional
factors by both proponents and opponents of tax reform has focused almost exlusively on
matters such as the role of deductions as incentives for carrying out private conduct that
the government wishes to encourage. See, e.g., Stone, Tax Incentives as a Solution to Urban
Problems, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 647 (1969); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Imple-
menting Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970).
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deductions are also, in the opinion of some commentators, ineffi-
cient means of attaining nonrevenue ends.
This dim view of personal deductions is unwarranted for a
number of reasons. First, although critics generally agree on the
definition of income, they have failed to define its key compo-
nents. As a result, they leave unresolved the question of whether
personal deductions are necessary to assure that only income is
taxed.4  Moreover, in focusing exclusively on the extensiveness of
an income tax, these critics overlook the role that our society in-
tends this tax to play. Consequently, critics ignore the capacity of
deductions to insure that the base is compatible with the principal
reasons underlying society's adopting the income tax. Finally,
critics also ignore the role that personal deductions can play in
insuring the primacy of fundamental social, economic, and politi-
cal values. In so doing, these critics elevate values implicit in a
comprehensive income tax above all other values.
This Article proposes a three-tiered test to evaluate the pro-
priety of personal deductions. First, one should measure all
deductions against a generally accepted definition of income to
determine if they are essential in arriving at the goal of taxing in-
come.5 Second, an examination of deductions is necessary to de-
termine whether their continued existence is related to the basic
reasons why our society adopted and maintains an income tax.
Third, one should ascertain whether deductions are required to
insure the primacy of fundamental social, economic, and political
values. Judging the validity of a given deduction involves balanc-
ing all the above factors; none of them alone should be deter-
minative.
' But see Andrews, Personal Deductions in An Ideal Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309 (1972).
The approach suggested by this Article differs somewhat from that suggested by Professor
Andrews in terms of this author's willingness to offer a definition rather than a discussion
of consumption and to include factors other than definition of the income tax base as
appropriate in deriving the ideal tax base.
5 This article adopts the Haig-Simons definition of income. Professor Henry Simons
has defined income as the sum of personal consumption and the increase (or decrease) in
net worth between two points in time. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62
(1938). In its broadest sense income includes the imputed income derived from services an
individual performs for himself and from employing property for his own use. Id. 110-124.
Other items of consumption that might be regarded as income are the public benefits
available to citizens, such as public primary and secondary education. Professor Bittker
suggests that such benefits are income, but does not advocate their taxation. See Bittker, A
"Comprehensive Tax Base" As a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REv. 925 (1967).
Professor Aaron criticizes this view on the ground that the Haig-Simons definition should
only include private benefits in its calculation of consumption. Aaron, supra note 1. See
notes 43-49 and accompanying text infra.
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The deduction for state and local taxes 6 provides a helpful
paradigm for the application of the proposed test. This deduc-
tion, provided by section 164 of the Internal Revenue Code, is the
largest personal deduction. According to the Tax Expenditure
Budget for fiscal year 1979-1980, section 164 will result in a di-
munition of $6,615,000,000 due to the deductibility of property
tax on owner-occupied residences, and $12,450,000,000 due to
the deductibility of all other nonbusiness state and local taxes.7
The latter figure alone exceeds the expected revenue loss from
either the mortgage interest deduction or the favored treatment
accorded long term capital gains. 8  Despite its striking fiscal im-
portance, section 164 has attracted limited interest from scholars. 9
I
HISTORY OF THE DEDUCTION FOR TAXES
It is necessary to explore the legislative history of personal
deductions for taxes to understand the principal functions of sec-
tion 164. A grasp of the purposes of section 164 is essential to the
application of the proposed three-tiered test. The first federal in-
come tax, 10 enacted in 1861 to help finance the Civil War," al-
lowed a deduction for federal, state, and local taxes incurred as a
business expense.' 2  The Revenue Act of 1864, as amended in
6 I.R.C. § 164.
' The deductibility of property taxes on owner-occupied residences may result in a
diminuation in federal revenues of $6,615,000,000.00. The deductibility of other taxes may
account for an additional loss of $12,450,000.00. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
supra note 1, at 208, 211.
8 The tax expenditure budget estimates that the mortgage interest deduction, the sec-
ond most important personal deduction, produces a revenue loss of $9.29 billion. Current
treatment of long term capital gain costs the federal government $10.15 billion. Id. at 208.
9 Between 1968 and 1978, the CCH FED. TAX ARTICLES index contained only 12
entries under § 164, none of which involved a policy-oriented analysis of the deduction.
10 Many of the colonies imposed a "faculty tax" that presumed that certain trades or
professions would generate given income levels. Individuals in those trades were taxed
accordingly, although the assessor often had discretion to make upward or downward ad-
justments based on his judgment of an individual's earnings. See E. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME
TAX, 367-87 (1911). In 1840, Pennsylvania imposed what may have been the first Ameri-
can income tax. Id. at 400. Originally, Pennsylvania only imposed this tax on the salaries of
state employees and dividends of state banks. In 1841, the scope of the tax was broadened
to include compensation paid by all state chartered corporations. See 1840 Pa. Laws 612-
613, amended by 1841 Pa. Laws 307, 310.
" Because it was repealed prior to the payment date of June 30, 1862 and replaced by
the Revenue Act of 1862, no revenue was ever raised under the 1861 Act. See Act of July
1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 89-93, 12 Stat. 473.
12 See Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 309, which provided: "That, in estimat-
ing said income, all national, state, or local taxes assessed upon the property, from which
the income is derived, shall be first deducted."
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1865, provided the first personal deduction for taxes. 13 Al-
though the legislative history is inconclusive, some commentators
have suggested that Congress enacted the deduction out of a de-
sire to avoid imposing a tax on a tax. However, more subtle fac-
tors also may have been at work.
Because the imputed income attributable to owner-occupied
residences was escaping taxation, 14 Congress apparently sought to
achieve equity between homeowners and renters in 1863 by pro-
viding a deduction for the amount paid for rent of a personal
residence.' 5  The Revenue Act of 1864 explicitly excluded from
taxable income the imputed income attributable to the rental
value of an owner-occupied residence and continued the deduc-
tion for rental of a personal residence. 16  The deduction for taxes
13 See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 281 as amended by Act of March 3,
1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 479. The 1865 amendment to the 1864 Revenue Act provided: "[A]fl
national, state, county, and municipal taxes paid within the year shall be deducted from
the gains, profits, or income of the person who has actually paid the same, whether owner,
tenant, or mortgagor."
Prior to its amendment, the 1864 Act had allowed a deduction for "all national, state,
and municipal taxes, other than the national income tax lawfully assessed .... upon the
property or sources of income of any person .... from which said annual gains, profits or
income is or should be derived.... See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 281.
Two observations should be made in contrasting this language with the statute as amended.
First, the original 1864 language is capable of being construed to allow a deduction only
for business taxes and taxes on income producing property. Second, the original language
did not allow a deduction for the federal income tax in computing that tax. An early
ruling, however, construed the provision as allowing a deduction for all taxes. See G.
BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 105,
153 (1864).
The subsequent 1865 amendment to the 1864 Act changed the language to indicate
clearly that the deduction for taxes includes nonbusiness taxes and to include the federal
income tax in the category of deductible taxes. See Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat.
479. No explanation for either the Treasury's Ruling or Congress' acquiescence to it in 1865
was found.
14 The concept of taxing the imputed income derived from owner-occupied residence
is hardly novel. The 1799 British income tax, which was the first modern income tax and a
direct economic consequence of the British military reaction to the French Revolution,
listed "Income of Lands occupied by the Owner" and "Houses and Buildings occupied by
the Owner" as the first and second items of income on Schedule A and taxed an owner of
such property on the value it would bring if rented by the owner to a third party. 39
GEORGE III, ch. 13 § 22 (1799)
"5 See Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 74, § 11, 12 Stat. 723 ("That in estimating the annual
gains, profits, or income, of any person .... the amount actually paid by such person for
the rent of the dwelling-house or estate on which he resides shall be first deducted from the
gains, profit, or income of such person.") (emphasis in original).
IS See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 281.
The amount paid by any person for the rent of the homestead used or
occupied by himself or his family, and the rental value of any homestead used
or occupied by any person, or by his family, in his own right or in the right of
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may have represented an attempt to provide the homeowner with
a deduction equal to the amount of the property tax component
of the rent charged by a landlord, and for which the tenant was
indirectly receiving a deduction.1 7  The genesis of the deduction
for state and local taxes can perhaps be viewed as an attempt to
inject an element of equity into the tax system by equalizing the
tax treatment of renters and homeowners. Even if Congress did
not intend this result, it is undeniable that the deduction for
taxes, when coupled with the deduction for interest added by the
Revenue Act of 1870,18 had this effect.
In 1872 Congress repealed the income tax. When reinsti-
tuted in 1894, the tax bore only a partial similarity to the forego-
ing features of its predecessor. Gone were the rental deductions
and all references to the imputed income stemming from the
value of owner-occupied residences, with exclusion of the latter
apparently taken for granted. Present, however, was the provision
allowing unrestricted deduction of all federal, state, and local
taxes.' 9 Because of the removal of the rental deduction, the de-
duction for state and local taxes could no longer be justified as a
measure to affect rough tax equity between renters and home-
owners.
Nineteen years after the Supreme Court held the 1894 tax
unconstitutional, 2° Congress, exercising the powers given it by the
sixteenth amendment, passed the Revenue Act of 1913.2" The
his wife, shall not be included and assessed as part of the income of such per-
son.
Id.
17 Because taxes other than those on residences are deductible, one might reject this
suggestion. However, most nonbusiness taxes at the time were property taxes on residences
and their contents. If one views deductibility of the federal income tax as the equivalent of
a rate reduction (see note 25 infra), it is apparent that the 1865 Act provided litde in the
way of a personal deduction for taxes other than real property taxes.
18 See Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 9, 16 Stat. 258.
19 See Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 State. 553. The Act also contained a
number of features found in earlier Revenue Acts, including: the exemption for farm
produce consumed by producers and their families (originally added in 1867); the deduc-
tion for all interest paid (originally added in 1870); and the deduction for losses arising
from fires, storms, or shipwrecks or losses from worthless debts (originally added in 1870).
See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 478; Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 9, 16
Stat. 258.
20 See Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
21 Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 167. The Act provided a deduction for
"[a]ll national, state, country, school and municipal taxes paid within the year, not includ-
ing those assessed against local benefits." The exclusion of taxes assessed against local ben-
efits represented the only change in deductions provided by the Revenue Act of 1894.
[Vol. 66:262266
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new Act closely resembled the Revenue Act of 1894 and, like its
predecessor, allowed a deduction for taxes. The only reason Con-
gress articulated for the deduction was that because these levies
reduced ability to pay, equity warranted excluding them from the
tax base.2 2  In 1916, Congress broadened the category of deduc-
tible taxes to include foreign taxes.2
The Revenue Act of 1917 repealed the deduction for federal
income taxes.2 4 Until this congressional action, taxpayers had
claimed a deduction for federal income taxes paid or incurred in
each year. Faced with the need to raise revenue to finance the
country's entry into World War I, Congress considered raising the
rates substantially, but settled on removing the deduction for fed-
eral income taxes. It should be noted that if a tax is deductible in
computing the tax itself, one rate is a function of the other. It is
therefore possible to design a rate schedule for a "non-deductible"
tax that will produce the same revenue as a seemingly higher rate
schedule would produce if the tax were deductible from the
base.2 5 Viewed in this light, one can characterize the 1917
changes as nothing more than a significant increase in the tax
rate, effected by removing a deduction that was a function of the
existing tax structure.
In 1934 Congress excluded from the category of deductible
taxes all estate, inheritance, and gift taxes, 26 reasoning that they
"are not incurred in the production of income, and liability for
them attaches regardless of whether there is any income."' 27  If
22 See 55 CONG. REC. 6317-18 (1917) (Remarks of Sen. McCumber, member, Finance
Committee).
23 Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a), 39 Stat. 759.
24 Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 1200, 40 Stat. 330.
25 See 55 CONG. REC. 6322 (1917) (Remarks of Sen. Smoot). For example, an accrual
basis taxpayer who is taxed at the rate of 33.3% under a non-deductible tax will pay the
same total tax as he would if he were taxed at the rate of 50%, with the tax allowed as a
deduction. One can compute the tax rate under a deductible tax system that will yield a tax
equal to the tax yielded under a system in which the tax is not deductible, using the follow-
ing formula: A=B+AB. A stands for the rate under the deductible system and B stands
for the rate under the non-deductible system. Although it is possible in theory to view a
nondeductible tax as equivalent to a deductible tax that employs somewhat higher rates,
practical problems arise. For example, assume a cash basis taxpayer pays his tax on his
1981 income in 1982 and that a decline in earnings puts him in a lower tax bracket in
1982. Unless cash basis accounting rules are altered, it is a practical impossibility to pro-
duce the same tax result for him under a deductible and a non-deductible*tax system in
which the rates have been developed pursuant to the above formula.
21 See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277 § 23(c)(3), 48 Stat. 688.
27 H.R. REP. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1934).
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Congress strictly applied this rationale it might have disallowed as
personal deductions all but income taxes. That this step was not
considered may indicate that Congress was responding to the
existing exclusion of gratuitous conveyances from income and at-
tempting to confine any adjustments to the tax base and effective
rates arising from gratuitous conveyances to the estate and gift
taxes.2 8
The next major revision of deductions for taxes took place in
1964. From 1865 to 1964, Congress had permitted the deduction
of all taxes except those it specifically excluded. In 1964, Congress
retained the list of nondeductable taxes,29 but added a new sec-
tion to the Code that allowed personal deductions only for certain
designated taxes,30 thereby decreasing considerably the number of
taxes for which a personal deduction would be allowed 1.3  The
amended Code allowed a personal deduction for the following
state and local taxes: real and personal property taxes, income,
war, and excess profits, and gasoline and motor fuel taxes. In ad-
dition, Congress permitted a personal deduction for foreign real
property, income, war, and excess profits taxes. Congress also re-
tained the deductibility of state and local income taxes as "an im-
portant means of accommodation where both the state and local
governments on one hand and the federal government on the
other hand tap this same revenue source ...., 32 Congress's unwill-
ingness to produce a dramatic shift in the existing pattern of dis-
tribution of the federal tax burden between homeowners and
non-homeowners prompted its refusal to remove the deduction
for property taxes. Congress retained the deduction for sales
and gasoline taxes because it believed that by extending deduc-
tions to all major revenue producing state and local taxes, states
could freely structure their tax systems in a neutral environ-
ment.34
28 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2001(b), 2011, 2012, 2053(d).
29 See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 275, 78 Stat. 42.
30 Id. § 207, 78 Stat. at 40.
31 The principal additional taxes that § 164 disallowed as deductions were state and
local auto license taxes, alcoholic beverage, cigarette, and selected excise taxes. See H.R.
REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1963).
32 Id. at 48.
33 Id. The notion that equity should bar the removal of inequitable provisions because
taxpayers have come to rely on them is a recurring one in the tax area. For a discussion of
certain aspects of this problem, see Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in
Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977).
24 H.R. REP. No. 749, supra note 31, at 48-50; S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
54-55 (1964).
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The last major revision of tax deductions 3 5 took place in
1978, when Congress eliminated the deduction for state gasoline
and motor fuel taxes. In prior unsuccessful attempts to repeal the
gasoline tax deduction, 36 proponents had stressed problems of en-
forcement, the possibility of financing an across-the-board rate cut
using the revenue gained from disallowance, and the undesirable
encouragement of gasoline use that stemmed from the deduc-
tion. 37 The main reason articulated by Congress in 1978 for re-
pealing the tax deduction was that the tax was fundamentally a
user fee-a tax on a personal expense for automobile travel-
and as such, was distinguishable from the income tax and other
general state and local taxes. 8  Congress noted the difficulty of
verifying the amount claimed for gasoline taxes as well as the in-
appropriateness of such a deduction at a time when conservation
of energy and reduction of oil imports were important national
goals.
In summary, the personal deduction for taxes probably arose
out of a desire to equalize the tax treatment of renters and non-
renters; the continuation of the deduction for real property taxes
and the removal of the deduction for renters gives rise to one of
the principal inequities in the treatment of renters and home-
owners in our Code. Moreover, Congress has left the deductibility of
the state income tax firmly intact for what it believes to be good
reasons. Finally, having reached that decision, a desire to preserve
the de facto ability of the states to shape their revenue raising
programs has led Congress to retain the deductible status of most
of the major sources of state revenue. These considerations ac-
quire added importance in the analysis of the deduction for state
and local taxes.
'5 In 1974 Congress amended § 275 to include the taxes imposed by chapters 42 and
43 on certain activities involving private foundations. See Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1016(a)(1), 88 Stat. 929, amending I.R.C. § 275.
In 1972, Congress amended § 164(b)(2) by including subsection (E), which specifies that
when the rate of sales tax on motor vehicles exceeds the general sales tax rate, the general
rate will be treated as the rate of tax. See Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-580, § 4, 86
Stat. 177.
36 See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1964).
37 See S. REP. No. 938, supra note 36.
38 See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1978).
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DEFINING THE BASE
To determine whether existing personal deductions repre-
sent unwarranted erosions of the tax base, it is first essential to
establish an acceptable definition of income. Early modern
economists agreed that income consists of a flow of
satisfactions-of intangible psychological experience. 39 The need
to produce an objective measurement of these highly subjective
satisfactions caused the theorists to equate the value of the goods
and services used to produce these satisfactions with income.4 °
Professor Haig characterized income as "the money value of
the net accretion of one's economic power between two points of
time."41  Professor Henry Simons rejected the early concern with
sensation and added to Haig's definition the element of consump-
tion, a refinement that he rightly credited Haig with making con-
ceptually, but not literally.42 The Simons definition posits: "Per-
sonal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the mar-
ket value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in
the value of the store of property right between the beginning
and end of the period in question." 43 Explaining the definition in
greater detail, Simons observed that:
Personal income connotes, broadly, the exercise of control
over the use of society's scarce resources. It has to do not with
sensations, services, or goods but rather with rights which
command prices (or to which prices may be imputed). Its calcu-
lation implies estimate (a) of the amount by which the value of
a person's store of property rights would have increased, as be-
tween the beginning and end of the period, if he had con-
sumed (destroyed) nothing, or (b) of the value of rights which
he might have exercised in consumption without altering the
value of his store of rights. In other words, it implies estimate
of consumption and accumulation. Consumption as a quantity
denotes the value of rights exercised in a certain way (in de-
struction of economic goods); accumulation denotes the change
in ownership of valuable rights as between the beginning and
end of a period."4
Haig, The Concept of Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921),
reprinted in AMERICAN ECONOMICS Ass'N, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 55
(R. Musgrave & C. Sharp eds. 1959).
40 Id. at 9, AMERICAN ECONOMICS Ass'N at 57.
41 Id. at 11, AMERICAN ECONOMICS ASS'N at 59.
42 H. SIMONS, supra note 5, at 61-62.
41 Id. at 50.
44 Id. at 49-50.
[Vol. 66:262270
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It is significant that, according to Simons, an individual's tax
base consists only of the resources he consumes or retains to fi-
nance additional consumption. Moreover, in Simons's view, con-
sumption involves the destruction or use of goods (or services) for
a private purpose. Taxing an individual on his use of society's
scarce resources is understandable in a world in which an ever-
growing population competes for a larger share of a finite supply
of raw materials. 45  Thus, the destruction of resources for private
benefit is one of the key characteristics of consumption in the de-
finition of income. 46
It is difficult to measure consumption and accumulation.
Therefore, it is appropriate to use an individual's inflow of wealth
as a tax base and to permit deductions therefrom that are neces-
sary to reflect one's consumption and accumulation. Personal de-
ductions thereby lessen the danger of taxing more than income
when the inflow of wealth is substituted for income as the base of
our income tax system. Professor Andrews describes the role
played by personal deductions as follows:
An ideal base for distributing personal tax burdens may be
aggregate personal consumption plus accumulation of real
goods and services. But it is not feasible to measure that quan-
tity directly. We rely on money expenditures to provide a practi-
cal measure of the real consumption and accumulation which
such spending buys. However, it is not practical to record and
audit even personal expenditures directly. Consequently, we
rely on the long run equivalence between money income and
4 Under the auspices of the Club of Rome, a study was conducted at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology of the implications of present population and consump-
tion trends. The study concluded that if present trends continue, the world's entire indus-
trial and agricultural bases will collapse, resulting by the year 2100 in a precipitous drop in
population from unchecked disease and starvation. See D.H. MEADOWS, D.L. MEADOWS, J.
RANDERS, & W. BEHRENS, THE LImITS OF GROWTH (1972). But cf. H. COLE, MODELS OF
Doom (1973).
" Some theorists have proposed that gifts be taxed as income because, like most other
accretions, they increase in net worth. See, e.g., Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform:
Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1177 (1978); H. SIuONS, supra note
5, at 125. Taxing gifts seems appropriate because the transferor does not consume trans-
ferred assets, but puts them in the hands of the transferee, who may consume or save
them. As Professor Bernard Wolfman has observed, a consistent definition of income (and
rejection of the sensations approach to income) appears to require that the donor be per-
mitted a deduction from income equal to the amount of the gift. Because this approach
would make assignment of income easier than taking spinach away from a two year old
child, however, one is tempted to agree with Professor Wolfman that the present system of
taxing income and gratuitous transfers separately is preferable to the proposed changes.
Address by Bernard Wolfman, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. University of North
Carolina Law School Speaker's Forum (April 6, 1979).
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money expenditures for consumption and accumulation and
compute the tax on the basis of the former.
The appropriate role of personal deductions in an ideal
income tax base is .... to adjust for discrepancies between
money income and real consumption and accumulation result-
ing from expenditures for items that we do not wish to take
into account as part of the aggregate personal consumption or
accumulation we wish to tax.
47
The deduction allowed for casualty losses 48 illustrates how
personal deductions insure that only income is taxed. Take the
case of money or property that has been stolen. Stolen funds rep-
resent a dimunition in wealth unrelated to consumation on the
part of the taxpayer. Consequently, a deduction equal to their
value is necessary to tax only income. In the case of property, one
might assert that if not held for business purposes, it simply
proved to have a shorter life span than originally anticipated;
therefore, its loss can be labeled as consumption. However, be-
cause it was only the use of the property to date that represents
personal consumption, 49 and because the remaining value of the
property had the potential to be converted to business use or
transformed into money, it is anomalous to treat the property dif-
ferently from the funds. Once one concludes that the theft pro-
duces a dimunition in net worth that is not classifiable as con-
sumption, some adjustment should be made to insure that only
income is taxed. Hence, the casualty loss deduction. 50
Despite the widespread acceptance of the Haig-Simons defi-
nition of income, few scholars have expended effort to define its
key component, consumption. 5 1 If personal deductions are
necessary to insure that only income is taxed, then deductions are
justified if they represent decreases in net worth that do not con-
47 Andrews, supra note 4, at 327-331. For a criticism of Professor Andrews approach,
see Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an 'Ideal' Income Tax and Why
They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979).
48 I.R.C. § 165(c)(3).
Although one might assert that consumption of the property occurred when it was
acquired for personal purposes, this view is inconsistent with the Code's general treatment
of capital goods used in a trade or business, which requires their cost to be depreciated
over their useful lives. See I.R.C. §§ 167, 263.
50 For a similar, although less elaborate, analysis of the role of the deduction provided
for casualty losses, see Due, Personal Deductions, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 45 (J.
Pechman ed. 1977).
51 The only prior detailed consideration of the nature and character of consumption
found by this author is to be found in Andrews, supra note 4. Professor Andrews, however,
never defines the term.
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stitute consumption. To ascertain whether various deductions
compensate for nonconsumptive expenditures, it is necessary to
derive an acceptable definition of consumption.
Consumption represents the utilization of goods in the satis-
faction of wants or in the process of production, resulting in the
dimunition or destruction of their utility. 5 2 The desire to tax
each individual on his or her income, as opposed to gross receipts,
produces a tax only on the use of goods that create personal ben-
efit. In developing his definition of income, Simon observed
that "consumption as a quantity denotes the value of rights exer-
cised in a certain way (in destruction of economic goods) .... ,
It is the use and retention of resources-not their acquisition-
that constitutes income. 54 Moreover, if a system seeks to tax con-
sumption, it must tax individuals only on their use or destruction
of resources. It is therefore appropriate to include within the def-
inition of consumption a requirement that the use or destruction
of the assets be for the purpose of securing a private benefit.
Such a requirement also comports with Simon's concern that "per-
sonal income connotes .... the exercise of control over the use of
society's scarce resources." 55  This statement reflects the concern
that individuals be taxed only to the extent that they use or de-
stroy society's resources to obtain a personal benefit.56
Under this definition of consumption, it is important to de-
termine whether an individual derives a private-and therefore
taxable-benefit simply because as a member of the public he ben-
efits from public programs. For example, must the deduction for
state income taxes fall merely because a taxpayer obtains some
benefit, no matter how small, from various government programs
financed by his taxes? Or should the tax system require that the
52 See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 490 (1961).
5 H. SIMONS, supra note 5, at 49-50.
After paying lip service to the Haig-Simons' definition of income, many theorists
label every outflow of resources as consumption. They thereby advocate a system that taxes
the acquisition of resources rather than income. These theorists assume that all acquired
wealth, less the cost of producing it, will be consumed or used to augument a taxpayer's
net worth. This assumption leads to the conclusion that all personal deductions constitute
unwarranted erosions of the tax base. The critics ignore questions about what constitutes
consumption and whether it is appropriate to label all outflows of wealth as consumption.
See, e.g., S. SURREY, supra note 1, at 12-24.
5- H. SIMONS, supra note 5, at 49.
51 One might question whether the private benefit is commensurate in value with the
goods expended to acquire that benefit. However, the market place generally insures that
in the absence of an involuntary or a gratuitous transfer, the value of goods expended to
acquire a personal benefit will equal the value of that benefit.
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benefit for each individual from governmental programs be
commensurate with his taxes before eliminating the deductibility
of the tax? Because our income tax is an individual, rather than a
societal, tax, only the benefit that each individual derives from pub-
lic programs should be designated as consumption. 57
As Professor Bittker has observed, a strict application of the
Haig-Simons definition of income requires the inclusion in each
person's tax base of the public services utilized by that indi-
vidual.58  For example, an individual attending a state-supported
institution consumes not only the component of the cost of his
education represented by his tuition, but also the added cost to
the state of providing the education. Although administrative con-
cerns preclude taxing on this basis, the consumption represented
by public services that escapes taxation should not be arbitrarily
assigned to other parties, namely to those whose taxes provide the
public benefits to other members of the society. To do so would
be to turn an individual income tax into a societal income tax that
arbitrarily places the burden for that tax on persons not actually
benefiting from the consumption of resources. It is therefore
necessary to adopt a definition of consumption grounded on the
view that an out flow of funds resulting in a dimunition of an in-
dividual's net worth shall not be deemed consumption if the out-
flow provides a substantial benefit to the general public and an
insignificant private benefit to the party making the expenditure.
Defining consumption as an expenditure of funds that pro-
duces a private, as opposed to a general public, benefit means that
a deduction for state and local income taxes is essential if one is to
tax income only. Indeed, Congress in 1964 may have continued
the deduction for state and local income taxes precisely because of
-1 To avoid assignment of income problems, an individual's expenditures to finance
consumption of another individual (e.g. a family member) should be considered income of
the individual in control of the funds. Where, as a result of a gift to a charity, those funds
are used to finance consumption on the part of the general public, retention of the chari-
table contribution deduction is consistent with the I-aig-Simons definition of income. For a
similar approach to the charitable contribution issue, see Andrews, supra note 4, at 344-75.
In answering charges that the donor gets the satisfaction of chosing the donee, one should
note that Simons viewed income not in terms of psychic satisfaction, but rather as involving
the actual destruction or use of goods. See H. SumoNs, supra note 5.
Whether the Haig-Simons definition of income is of any assistance in determining the
proper taxing unit, and consequently whether a family allowance and a return to the joint
tax schedule is desirable, is beyond the scope of this Article. For such a discussion, see
McIntrye & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1573 (1977).
58 Bittker, A 'Comprehensive Tax Base' as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARv. L. REv.
925 (1967).
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such a consideration.5 9 A recent Treasury study also concluded
that the deduction for state and local income taxes is necessary to
reach the proper tax base in an income tax system premised on
the Haig-Simons definition of income.6 0  Although this rationale
seems to support a deduction for federal income taxes, such a
deduction is not necessary: the same result can be produced by
altering the rate schedule as was done in 1917.61 Unfortunately,
because some states do not tax income, and those that do apply
different effective tax rates, adjusting the rate structure will not
provide such a result for state and local income taxes.
The deduction for other state and local taxes, however, does
not rest on firm theoretical grounds. The now repealed gasoline
tax was perhaps the least justifiable of all of the state and local
taxes. Because most states used the revenues from gasoline taxes
to fund state highway departments, and because operators of
motor vehicles paid gasoline taxes that corresponded to their use
of the public roads, 2 the deduction for gasoline taxes provided
taxpayers with an exclusion from their tax base of a particular
type of consumption of public goods. The deduction for gasoline
taxes therefore is not an adjustment to receipts necessary to in-
sure that only income is taxed.
The sales and property taxes occupy an uncomfortable posi-
tion between the income tax and the gasoline tax. On the one
hand, the money paid to state and local governments in property
and sales taxes, like income tax payments, represents funds that
will be used to finance public, rather than private, consumption.
Moreover, the public benefits financed by such taxes are in no
way proportional to the sales and property taxes individual tax-
payers pay.6 3  On the other hand, these two taxes constitute the
financial consequences of decisions made by individual taxpayers
to consume society's scarce resources. For example, a taxpayer's
decision to purchase an automobile for personal use may result in
a state or local sales tax, and retention of the vehicle for such
59 See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
60 See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 1, at 92-93.
" See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
62 Given the relationships between the consumption of gasoline and the weight of the
automobile, the number of miles driven and the effect of mileage and weight on highway
wear produced by passenger vehicles, the gasoline tax comes as close as any tax to being a
user fee.
63 See H. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX? 1 (1975); B. HERBER, MODERN PUBLIC
FINANCE: THE STUDY OF PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 238-39 (1971). D. NETZER, ECONOMICS
OF THE PROPERTY TAX 59-60 (1966).
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purposes may result in the imposition of a personal property tax.
Such taxes are arguably costs of consumption-a factor that
weakens their claim to deductibility on the ground that an ad-
justment is required to insure that only income is being taxed.
Moreover, given the difference in the tax treatment between di-
rect and indirect property taxes, and between various types of
taxes on transfers of property at retail, justifying the deductions
as necessary to refine the base must be conceded to rest on ques-
tionable theoretical grounds. In the final analysis, it is appropriate
to suspend judgment temporarily on the issue of the deductibility
of sales and property taxes. To resolve the issue, other compelling
considerations must be examined.
III
SOCIETAL PRIME RATIONALES
A commendable goal of any income tax system is the taxation
of all income. But an income tax system must also be consistent
with what will be referred to as "societal prime rationales," that is,
reasons that prompt a society to embrace an income tax instead of
an alternative revenue-raising device. On occasion, society must
depart from the goal of taxing all income in order to prevent the
tax structure from conflicting with the societal prime rationales
underlying the tax system. Personal deductions provide one vehi-
cle for effecting such a departure.
The standards to which our tax system must conform are not
a set of platonic criteria derived by philosophers and theoreti-
cians. 64 Rather, the standards are those that society accepts for
itself in its decision to implement and maintain a tax system. The
legislative history of the tax code, its important distinguishing fea-
tures, and its principal functions in our economic system dem-
onstrate the societal prime rationales.
The United States employs an income tax as its principal rev-
enue raising device essentially for three reasons. First, an income
tax can easily be structured to insure that individuals are bur-
dened in proportion to their ability to pay. Second, the income
tax is a very efficient means of raising substantial revenue. Third,
an income tax, particularly a progressive one, provides society
with an automatic, as well as a discretionary, economic stabilizer.
" See, e.g., J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE 204-208 (6th ed. 1977);
B. HERBER, supra note 63, at 117-130; A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, bk.V, ch. 2, pt. II, at 777-79 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937);
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A. Ability to Pay
Historically, five different types of taxes have provided the
bulk of government revenue. The tax systems in most Western
societies have evolved through several fairly well-defined
stages. 65  In primitive societies, mere numbers constituted the
foundation for tax systems. The head tax, or poll tax, was a prin-
cipal source of revenue in both early Teutonic societies and in
Puritan New England.6 6  This mechanism often produced equita-
ble results in societies with relatively light tax burdens and sub-
stantially equal distributions of wealth.
With the development of private property systems and a
growing disparity in the accumulation of resources, a pronounced
shift toward property taxes grew out of an effort to develop a
more equitable tax system. 67  During the later Middle Ages, a
Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1965). Judge (then
Professor) Sneed blends subjectively-derived criteria with those he claims society applies in
formulating its tax system, and suggests that these criteria are:
(1) to supply adequate revenue, (2) to achieve a practical and workable income
tax system, (3) to impose equal taxes upon those who enjoy equal incomes, (4) to
assist in achieving economic stability, (5) to reduce economic inequality, (6) to avoid
impairment of the operation of the market oriented economy and (7) to accomplish
a high degree of harmony between the income tax and the sought-for political
order.
Id. at 568 (emphasis in original).
This Article posits only three societal prime rationales: (1) ability to pay; (2) counter-
cyclical capacity; and (3) major fund raising efficiency. Nonetheless, these criteria closely
resemble those posited by Sneed. Sneed's first two criteria are essentially this author's sec-
ond criterion. Moreover, if one assumes that a system premised on ability to pay will place
equal burdens on those with equal resources, and that it will place geometrically greater
burdens on those with greater resources, it is clear that Sneed's third and fifth criteria are
subsumed into this author's first criterion. It is this author's view that maintenance of com-
patibility between the tax system and a free market economy, if it ever was a goal of our
tax system, has long since vanished as a principal rationale for an income tax. When one
considers the frequent uses of a tax system in this country to manipulate the forces of the
free market, one has great difficulty in concluding that this criteria was ever of much
importance. Considering the use of the protective tariff to develop an American manufac-
turing industry and the extensive use of the tax system to invigorate the economy during
periods of recession, it is difficult to conclude that maintaining a free market is a societal
prime rationale of any American tax system.
Sneed's seventh criterion, harmony of the tax system and the political order, while not
a societal prime rationale of our tax system, comports with this author's view that the tax
system should be in harmony with the society's fundamental social, political, and economic
goals.
The primary congressional motivations for adopting or retaining an income tax
suggested here may produce some measure of disagreement. This disagreement about the
specific rationales is unimportant. What is important is the acknowledged legitimacy of
such an approach.
65 E. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 5 (1911).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 6.
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shift away from property taxes toward expenditure taxes began to
develop. 68 This shift stemmed from the problems of assigning a
fair value to property in the contemporary political, economic,
and social context. Although expenditure taxes represented an
improvement over the arbitrary results produced under most
existing property taxes, dissatisfaction began to grow with expen-
diture taxes because of a lack of equilibrium at the lower end of
the economic scale between revenue and expenditure. One of the
first orders of business in the French Revolution was to abolish
not only the taille, or general property tax, but also the entire
system of taxing consumption. The product or produce tax filled
the void. Under this scheme, government taxed the entire yield of
a piece of land, a building, or a business. It was, in essence, a
gross receipts tax. Many believed that this method would fairly
meet the demands of the tax collector because more valuable
properties would produce greater revenues.69 Because of con-
cerns over the difference between gross receipts and profits, the
gross produce tax gave way to a net produce tax, which in turn
evolved into an income tax similar to the one assessed today.7 0 A
unifying theme in the evolution of taxes was the search for a sys-
tem that, socially and economically, best matched ability to pay
with the tax burden ultimately shouldered by the individual.7 '
There is little question that in adopting the income tax, Con-
gress desired to establish a tax system geared to ability to pay.
Both politicians 72 and press 73 saluted the 1861 income tax as a
measure that would burden individuals in rough proportion to
their ability to pay. Although the end of the Civil War, as well as
the concern of eastern Congressmen that their constituents had
68 Id. at 10.
69 Id. at 11-13.
70 Id. at 14-15. The renewed interest in previously repudiated expenditure taxes in
the form of a tax on value-added is a curious development. See, e.g., S. DRESCH, A. LIN, &
D. STOUT, SUBSTITUTING A VALUE-ADDED TAx FOR THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX (1977); R.
LINDHOLM, VALUE-ADDED TAX AND OTHER TAX REFORMS (1976). The recent congressional
interest in a value-added tax is, however, somewhat consistent with the pattern of evolu-
tion. Proponents view the tax as a means to offset the need for further increases in the
regressive Social Security tax. Pierson, Congress Seeks to Cut Social Security Taxes But Retain
the Benefits, Wall St. J., June 8, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
71 E. SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 5-15.
72 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1861) (remarks of Mr. Pike), id. at
255 (remarks of Mr. Fesenden), id. at 301 (remarks of Mr. Wyckliffe).
7' See, e.g., New York Herald, August 5, 1861, reprinted in Ellis, Public Opinion and the
Income Tax, 1860-1900, 27 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REv. 225, 226 (1940),.which observed that:
"Millionaires like Mr. W.B. Astor, Commodore Vanderbilt ... and others, will henceforth
contribute a fair proportion of their wealth to the support of the national government."
[Vol. 66:262
PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS
borne a disproportionately large tax burden, brought the federal
income tax to an end in 1872, intense public interest persisted in
the income tax because of its equitable potential.7 4 In 1894,
when Congress again adopted an income tax, ability to pay
loomed as the dominant motivating consideration. 5 In 1913,
shortly after passage of the sixteenth amendment, Congress indi-
cated that it adopted the income tax because it was keyed to abil-
ity to pay, and therefore was a substantial improvement over the
existing high import duties (the government's principal source of
revenue at the time), which Congress viewed as an undesirable tax
on select forms of consumption.7 6  Thus, Congress in 1913 voted
to reduce customs duties, which it regarded as regressive, and to
substitute for them the progressive income tax system.77
Although all may not agree on all the reasons why our soci-
ety adopted an income tax, ability to pay was considered perhaps
the most important factor.78  Consequently, it is not surprising
that Congress has given some consideration to this factor in de-
termining the size of the tax burden of various individuals. The
goal of formulating a tax system based on ability to pay most
likely lay at the heart of decisions to establish a progressive rate
structure, to provide for personal exemptions and dependent de-
ductions, and to allow a deduction for certain expenditures, espe-
cially involuntary expenditures such as medical expenses.7 9
Moreover, as the earlier discussion of the legislative history of the
deduction for state and local taxes indicates, Congress in 1913
7" See Ellis, supra note 73, at 230-37.
71 See H.R. REP. No. 276, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-9 (1894); E. SELIGMAN, supra note 65,
at 407-508.
71 See H.R. REP. No. 5, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. xxxvii (1913).
77 Id.
7' Leading authorities on public finance universally agree that taxation according to
ability to pay is one of the principal characteristics of an income tax. See, e.g., J. DuE & A.
FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 64, at 206-08; J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 54 (3d ed.
1977); B. HERBER, supra note 63, at 118-22; R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 215-16 (2d ed. 1976).
79 Professor Andrews suggests that the deduction for medical expenses is justified be-
cause as involuntary expenditures devoid of pleasure, they do not constitute consumption.
See Andrews, supra note 2, at 331-43. It seems more appropriate, however, to label such
expenditures consumption because they do entail a destruction of resources for personal
benefit. Their deductibility is better justified on the ability to pay rationale. For example,
take the case of two taxpayers who earn $20,000 each per year, one of whom incurs ex-
penses of $3,000 to repair a broken leg. The latter individual obviously has had his ability
to pay substantially impaired while the former has not. The medical expense deduction is
defensible as a device for reflecting diminished ability to pay.
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originally included that deduction in part because of concerns
over ability to pay.80
One difficulty with allowing a deduction for involuntary ex-
penditures is that such expenditures may include a broad range
of items, including food and shelter, medical services, and certain
employer-mandated expenses, such as contributions to pension
plans. Moreover, the potential for a taxpayer to arrange for an
employer to "require" certain expenditures suggests that it is un-
wise to permit a deduction for all involuntary expenditures.
It is, in this author's opinion, appropriate to allow a deduc-
tion for two types of involuntary expenditures: (1) those that are
necessary for survival and basic well-being; and (2) those that do
not provide the taxpayer with personal benefit substantially com-
mensurate in value with the amount of the expenditure. It would
be unwise to tax the consumption necessary to sustain life and
good health. The latter category of deductions is appropriate
because it represents involuntary expenditures that are not cal-
culated to avoid taxation.
Basic expenditures for food, shelter, and medical care qualify
under the first deduction test.8 ' Personal exemptions, dependent
deductions, and the zero bracket amount provide an adequate
means of allowing for basic expenditures for food and shelter.
Due to the arbitrary nature of most disease and injury, and in the
absence of a national medical program, provision for necessary
medical expenses can only be made by resorting to a personal
deduction. 82
Although ability to pay is often discussed in terms of horizontal equality (treating all
taxpayers of the same income levels equally) and vertical equality (treating taxpayers of
different income levels differently), the basic prescription of equal sacrifice or loss of wel-
fare that lies at the heart of the ability to pay standard would seem to call for an adjust-
ment in an individual's tax base to reflect certain involuntary consumptions, such as ex-
penditures for medical service, that reduce a taxpayer's net worth. See R. MUSGRAVE & P.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 78, at 215-20.
SO See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
81 It should be noted that with the exception of taxes, most "mandated" expenditures
that satisfy the requirements of this test will be allowed as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. For example, items such as uniform and travel expenses are deductible under
§ 162.
82 Section 213 presently allows a deduction for all expenditures for medical care. It
does not distinguish between those expenditures necessary for maintaining good health
and those, such as cosmetic surgery, that constitutue medical forms of consumption. The
logical solution to this problem may be to limit deductions to those expenditures that are
medically necessary. However, the poor history of the Service with such a standard in
§ 162 does not give one much reason to be hopeful.
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The second test for deductions justifies the deduction for
state and local income taxes. They represent involuntary expendi-
tures of resources that usually bring little personal benefit to the
taxpayer. Taxpayers' abilities to satisfy their federal tax liabilities
are somewhat impaired to the extent that they are required to
make state or local income tax remittances. Because some states
do not tax income and because of the diverse rates in states that
do have income taxes, refusing to permit a deduction for such
taxes would result in taxpayers with equal levels of receipts having
varying abilities to meet their federal income tax liabilities.
Although the principle of ability to pay considerably
strengthens the case for deduction of state and local income taxes,
it does not justify the deduction for state and local sales and
property taxes. These taxes are largely discretionary because they
correspond to an individual's consumption of taxed goods. Al-
though imposition of taxes on essential items, such as food and
lodging, may tempt analysts to characterize them as involuntary to
some degree, personal exemptions, dependent deductions, and
the zero bracket amount are probably sufficient to cover the por-
tion of these taxes that is de facto involuntary.
B. Efficient Major Fund Raiser
An additional important reason for Congress's choice of an
income tax is that it efficiently raises vast sums of money. As pre-
viously noted, the need to finance the Civil War prompted Con-
gress to adopt the first income tax.83 Similarly, when Populists
and Progressives sought to reduce the burden of the tariff and
provide the government with new sources of revenue, they turned
to the income tax in 1894 and 1913.84 In fiscal year 1978, indi-
vidual and corporate income taxes combined generated almost
70% of all federal tax revenue. 85  Although other taxes, such as a
value added tax or a tax on gross receipts, could produce com-
parable amounts of revenue, none could perform this task with-
out impairing other vital concerns, such as insuring that the tax
system is geared toward ability to pay. 86
13 See S. RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 57-99 (1967).
14 Id. at 168-92, 298-336.
83 In fiscal 1978, the individual income tax produced 53.3% of gross Internal Revenue
collections and the corporate income tax produced 16.4%, whereas employment taxes, the
estate and gift taxes, and excise taxes produced respectively 24.3%, 1.3%, and 4.7% of
federal gross tax revenues. See COMM'R I.R.S., ANN. REP. 9 (1978).
"6 The value added tax may appear regressive, and consequently not geared toward
ability to pay. However, this tax may actually represent a step toward greater progressivity
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The income tax performs its revenue raising function in a
relatively efficient manner. Efficiency as a general goal of taxation
dates back at least to Adam Smith, who included in his canons of
taxation the maxim: "Every tax ought to be so contrived as both
to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as
possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury of
the state."8 7 This country adopted the income tax in part be-
cause of its potential for administrative efficiency. 88  Government
data demonstrate the validity of this decision. Although the Inter-
nal Revenue Service does not keep separate figures on the cost of
administering each tax, the composite governmental administra-
tion cost for fiscal year 1978 for all taxes was 49 cents per $100 of
revenue raised. 89  The income tax accounts for almost 70% of all
federal tax revenue. Thus, even if the entire cost of administering
the tax laws was attributable to the income tax, it would only cost
69 cents to raise $100 of revenue-well within the realm of an
administratively efficient tax.
The efficiency of a tax, however, is determined not only by
the cost of its administration, but also by the cost to the taxpayer
of complying with the tax laws. 90 Unfortunately, there is no reli-
able data on the cost of complying with the federal income tax. 91
if it is employed as an alternative to the highly regressive Social Security tax. See note 70
supra.
s A. SMITH, supra note 64, at 778.
8 See H.R. REP. No. 276, 53d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1894), in which the Ways and Means
Committee, speaking about the income tax, observed: "It is believed by the committee that
this tax can be collected more cheaply than the internal revenue taxes now imposed." See
also H.R. REP. No. 5, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. xxxvii (1913), in which the Ways and Means
Committee noted: "The tax upon incomes is levied according to ability to pay, and it would
be difficult to devise a tax fairer or cheaper of collection." Much of the praise of the
efficiency of the income tax is now based on the government's expeditious administration
of it. See, e.g., J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 64, at 297. By way of contrast, one
might note that per dollar of revenue raised, the British Inland Revenue Service spends
four times as much on administration as does the I.R.S. See J. KAY & M. KING, THE
BRITISH TAX SYsTEit 68 (2d ed. 1980).
89 See CO M'R I.R.S., supra note 85, at 103. The reasons for not keeping such figures
include the audit agent's responsibility for enforcing all federal taxes, references in official
publications and instructions to several kinds of taxes, and conventional cost allocation
problems such as appropriate procedures to be used to allocate overhead and other gen-
eral costs.
90 In recent years, there has been a growing tendency on the part of government to
impose the costs for a variety of socially beneficial programs on the private sector without
regard to the cost-benefit ratio of such undertakings. See Crandall, Curbing the Costs of Social
Regulation, 15 THE BROOKINGS BULL. No. 3, at 1 (1979).
" The only study of this issue of which this author is aware is a rather dated analysis
of the compliance costs of several corporate taxpayers with respect to a variety of taxes,
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Political considerations may partly explain the reticence of the
Treasury to conduct such a study. However, legitimate concerns
about the difficulty of assigning taxpayers' costs hamper efforts to
obtain an accurate estimate of compliance costs. 92  Moreover,
existing data on compliance with state laws is inconclusive con-
cerning the cost of complying with the federal income tax.93
Nonetheless, the typical taxpayer who itemizes deductions un-
doubtedly spends a considerable period of time preparing his an-
nual federal tax return. 94
The importance of preserving the revenue-raising efficiency
of the income tax by reducing the cost of taxpayer compliance is a
significant factor in evaluating individual personal deductions.
High compliance costs might induce Congress to disallow a deduc-
tion otherwise allowable as necessary to perfect the tax base. Any
such step, of course, should only be taken after balancing consid-
erations of efficiency against those factors that point to retention
of a deduction. For example, persuasive policy reasons can justify
two of the most time-consuming personal deductions, those for
charitable contributions and medical expenses.95
including the federal corporate income tax. See Martin, Costs of Tax Administration -Examples
of Compliance Expenses, 29 BULL. OF NAT'L TAx AsS'N 194 (1944). Because the study indi-
cates that compliance costs vary considerably from taxpayer to taxpayer and because in-
formation on how these costs were determined is lacking, the study provides few helpful
conclusions.
92 There are serious questions about what portion of accounting costs should be as-
signed to tax compliance, because accounting records are kept by businesses for a number
of reasons. The valuation of free time used to prepare a tax return presents another prob-
lem. For example, how should one account for the free time of a skilled surgeon whose
return preparation consumes an inordinate amount of time? His return could be prepared
by a lowly-compensated but skilled preparer in a short period of time.
" See Wicks & Killworth, Administrative and Compliance Costs of State and Local Taxes, 20
NAT'L TAX J. 309 (1967). This study of Montana state taxes does not indicate, among other
things, how the cost of keeping accounting records was apportioned, or how income tax
compliance costs were apportioned between state and federal returns. Moreover, because
the Montana income tax rates range from 1.1% to 7.9%, the relatively high cost of com-
pliance for individual taxpayers (almost 20% of revenue) cannot provide any guide to the
cost of complying with the federal income tax.
94 It is with a touch of nostalgia that one reads statements such as the following:
In view of the many valuable governmental purposes to be subserved,
those citizens required to do so can well afford to devote a brief time during some
one day in each year to the making out of a personal return of income for
purposes of taxation. This is done without complaint under the operation of all
the general property tax laws of the States. All good citizens, it is therefore
believed, will willingly and cheerfully support and sustain this, the fairest and
cheapest of all taxes, in order to secure to the largest extent equality of tax
burdens, and adjustable system of revenue, and in all respects a modernized
fiscal system.
H.R. REP. No. 5, 63d Cong., Ist Sess. xxxix (1913) (emphasis added).
"5 See generally Andrews, supra note 4; Stiglitz & Boskin, Impact of Recent Developments in
Public Finance Theory on Public Policy Decisions, 67 Ams. EcoN. Rev. 295 (1977).
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The deduction for state and local taxes is relatively easy to
administer and has virtually nonexistent compliance costs; the
amount of income tax deductible is easily ascertained from the
withholding statement and the prior year's state and local tax re-
turns. The sales tax is commonly determined by consulting the
charts included with the income tax instructions. By examining
the taxpayer's bank statement or the tax bill received during the
prior year it is easy to calculate the amount of property tax paid.
Although the deduction of such state and local taxes does not give
rise to a serious administrative or compliance problem, retention
of the deduction cannot be promoted on this ground. Nonethe-
less, Congress should accord more consideration to the issue of
administrative efficiency and taxpayer compliance costs than it has
in evaluating most tax provisions.96
C. Countercyclical Nature and Capacity
The government's principal nonrevenue use of the income
tax is as a tool of countercyclical management. Most people are
familiar with the discretionary use of the income tax for counter-
cyclical purposes that manifests itself in the form of tax cuts dur-
ing periods of economic slowdown. 97  Under the generally pre-
vailing Keynesian approach to managing the nation's economy,
during periods of economic decline the government stimulates the
economy by engaging in a program of deficit spending, and dur-
ing periods of excessive expansion it stems inflation by removing
money from the economy.
Less well known is the income tax's function as an automatic
economic stablization device. Because economic contraction de-
creases the government's revenues without necessarily resulting in
concomitant cuts in government spending, and because rapid
economic expansion increases such revenues without necessarily
resulting in proportional increases in spending, the income tax
serves as an automatic economic stabilization device.98 Although
other taxes, particularly expenditure taxes, perform this function
9' Congress has virtually ignored this issue in recent years. Concerns with non-
retroactivity and special interests have predominated over concerns with efficient adminis-
tration and compliance. Various qualifying provisions found in §§ 104, 105 and 1023 are
good examples of this. For an amusing analysis of the complicating recent changes made in
§§ 104 and 105 (ironically enough, in the name of simplification), see Bittker, Tax Reform
and Disability Pensions-The Equal Treatment of Equals, 55 TAXES 363 (1977).
" J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 8-14 (3d ed. 1977).
9' Id. at 11-14; B. HERBER, supra note 63, at 566-69.
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to some degree, the federal individual income tax is undeniably
the leading automatic economic stabilizer. Moreover, because of
features such as the zero bracket amount, the progressive rate
structure, personal exemptions, and the fixed nature of some de-
ductions such as interest on existing debt, there is a geometric
relationship between increases and decreases in personal income
and federal individual income tax receipts. For example, under
the prevailing rates in calendar year 1977, a ten percent increase
or decrease in personal income would have resulted in almost a
fifteen percent increase or decrease in federal income tax re-
ceipts. 99 Because business profits react more radically to
economic cycles than do personal incomes, the corporate income
tax performs this role of automatic stabilizer even more effec-
tively.100 Because of the difference in size between the proceeds
of individual and corporate income taxes, however, the former
has a substantially more important stabilizing effect than the lat-
ter.
To control properly business down cycles government must
employ tax cuts as well as spending and transfer programs. 1° 1
The income tax's potential as a discretionary economic stabilizer is
one of its principal nonrevenue features. In this capacity, the in-
come tax probably exceeds most other taxes and spending pro-
grams in importance. 0 2
Although the countercyclical effect of the income tax sup-
ports maintaining the tax, it has only a minor bearing on retain-
ing the deduction for state and local taxes. If, as would be ex-
pected, the ratio of the decline or increase in a taxpayer's state
and local taxes to the decline or increase of his gross income is
less than 1.0, the deduction will augment the role of the income
tax as an automatic economic stabilizer. For example, if a taxpayer
with an income of $20,000 and deductible taxes of $2,000 paid
state and local taxes of $1,800 when his income dropped to
$15,000, the relative decline in his federal income tax liability
would be somewhat greater than if such taxes had not been de-
99 J. PECHMAN, supra note 97, at 12.
100 Id. But see J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 64, at 320 (additional features of
the personal income tax, such as personal exemptions and deductions and a marked pro-
gressive rate structure, more than compensate for the greater fluctuations in corporate in-
come experienced during economic cycles).
101 See Musgrave & Miller, Built-In Flexibility, in 7 READINGS IN FISCAL POLICY 379 (A.
Smithies & J. Butters ed. 1955).
102 See, e.g., J. DUE & A. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 64, at 519-524; B. HERBER, supra note
63, at 569-72; J. PECHMAN, supra note 97, at 19-21.
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ductible. The impact of the section 164 deduction on this stabiliza-
tion feature of the income tax varies from state to state, depend-
ing on a variety of factors: whether a state's sales tax is imposed
on items with a relatively inelastic demand curve such as food;
what percentage of the taxpayer's state and local tax burden is
composed of relatively inelastic taxes, such as a property tax or a
sales tax on goods with a relatively inelastic demand curve; and
the degree of progressiveness in the state income tax structure.
For example, in a state that derives most of its revenue from a
progressive income tax and a sales tax on items with a relatively
elastic demand curve (services and consumer durables), the de-
duction provided by section 164 might actually have a mild nega-
tive impact on the automatic stabilization feature of the income
tax.
In the final analysis, section 164 has a minimal effect on the
stabilization function of the income tax. This relatively mild im-
pact, as well as the availability of better tools (such as rate adjust-
ments) for achieving economic stabilization, suggest that section
164 should be evaluated on the basis of other considerations.
IV
FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AND POLITICAL VALUES
The role of the income tax as a tool of economic and social
engineering extends far beyond its use as an economic stabilizer.
Given the magnitude of the tax rates and the vast sums of money
they raise, it is obvious that the income tax has the potential to
affect profoundly our economic, social, and political structures. It
is imprudent to ignore the effects upon these structures that stem
from numerous decisions concerning our tax laws, including deci-
sions to repeal existing deductions.
An ideal tax system should reflect the fundamental
economic, social, and political values of the society. To insist that
this not be done is to elevate those values implicit in an income
tax system over all other fundamental economic, social, and politi-
cal values. Consequently, adjustments to the tax base in the form
of deductions or exclusions may be required where they promote
a society's fundamental values, even if such deductions constitute
a departure from the goal of taxing an income. Alternately, when
certain deductions are necessary to perfect the tax base or are
consistent with the values implicit in an income tax, decisionmak-
ers might decide to disallow those deductions because of their
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negative impact on fundamental economic, social, or political val-
ues.
The impact of the tax structure on a society's fundamental
values, and adjustments in the tax base that should be made to
accommodate those values, cannot, however, be evaluated without
also considering governmental programs that may provide an al-
ternative means of supporting those values. For example, al-
though a desire to maintain a strong federal system suggests the
wisdom of section 103's exemption of interest on state and local
indebtedness, this goal could also be achieved by allowing state
and local governments to elect to issue either tax exempt bonds or
taxable bonds with a portion of the interest obligation of the states
and localities subsidized by the federal government. 10 3
Programs extrinsic to an income tax structure occasionally
provide a means of preserving the income tax base while simul-
taneously harmonizing government spending and taxing pro-
grams with basic societal values. However, such alternatives are not
always available and occasionally prove less desirable than adjust-
ments to the tax base. For example, assume the deduction for
charitable contributions departs from the goal of taxing all in-
come. Repealing the deduction would result in inadequate fund-
ing of the social service sector, which could only be remedied by a
centralized social services program.0 4 Such a program would
not, however, enhance diversity in our social service system,
which perhaps can best be supported by continuing the deduc-
tion.
Personal deductions provide one means of accommodating
the tax base to fundamental economic, social, and political values.
103 See, e.g., S. SURREY, supra note 1, at 209-22 and authorities cited therein.
104 The social services supported by the deduction could also be maintained by credit
programs. This would provide more charitable contributions from people at lower socio-
economic levels and fewer by those at higher ones. Because lower-income taxpayers tend to
give disproportionately to churches, whereas upper income taxpayers tend to give dispro-
portionately to health services and educational institutions, the Filer Committee recently
concluded that although substitution of a 30% credit for the present deduction would re-
sult in an overall 9% increase in charitable contributions, it would also result in an increase
of about 14% in gifts to churches and religious institutions and a drop of about 33% in
gifts to health services and educational institutions. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRI-
VATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS (1975), reprinted in S. WEITHORN, 3A TAX
TECHNIQUES FOR FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, Appendix Cl, at 133
(1977). Before adopting the credit alternative, Congress may wish to determine whether
this reallocation of resources in the private social service sector is desirable. It should then
weigh this determination against the theoretical case in favor of preserving the deduction
to insure the taxation of income. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
An added advantage of the deduction over a direct spending program is that for
contributions to religious organizations, the deduction provides a workable accommodation
between the competing claims of the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first
amendment of the Constitution.
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The principal problem with providing deductions based on such
considerations is that it is extremely difficult to determine: (1)
what values are worth preserving in this manner, and (2) whether
an erosion of the tax base is the most desirable means of support-
ing the value in question.
In determining the relative importance of various national
goals, decisionmakers should examine our law to assess the value
that society has placed on them in other contexts. If these goals
are derived from the Constitution, society has accorded them
great value. Similarly, government expenditures of significant
sums of money in support of particular goals indicate that society
deems them to be important. Regulatory programs furthering
nonrevenue goals are also good evidence of social support, as is
preferential treatment accorded these goals by our courts and
lawmakers. Thus, Congress must concur that the eradication of
racial discrimination is a national goal of the highest order. In
redrafting section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, which pro-
vides for deductions for charitable contributions, Congress might
accordingly tailor the deduction to exclude explicitly gifts to or-
ganizations that practice racial discrimination.' 0 5  On the other
hand, Congress should not make the cost of new automobiles de-
ductible for the purpose of improving our transportation sys-
tem.' 0
6
The deduction for state and local taxes arguably promotes a
healthy federal system. Because the states are presently weak ele-
ments in our federal system, analysts should consider whether re-
pealing section 164 would further impair their vitality. There are
at least two ways in which this could occur. First, if the existence
of section 164 has facilitated state revenue raising, its repeal could
diminish states' ability to fund necessary programs, making them
more reliant on the federal government. Second, upon determin-
ing that the deduction of the state income tax is essential to reach
the proper tax base, one confronts the following problem: if the
105 The requirement of racial impartiality has already been read into I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)
& 501(c)(3) by the courts. See Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
106 Although it appears unlikely that Congress will approve such a proposal, in 1975
Congress provided a 5% credit to individuals purchasing new homes. See I.R.C. § 44. The
avowed purpose of the credit was to help the housing industry through a period of
economic difficulty. See SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT TOGETHER WITH SUPPLEMENTAL
VIEWS ON H.R. 2166, TAX REDUCTION ACT OF 1975, S. REP. No. 36, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
2, 11-12, 36-38, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 54, 55, 64-65, 87-89. See
also Breisblatt v. Baker-Firestone, Inc., 564 F.2d 11, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1977).
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states account for deductibility in structuring their tax systems,
repealing the deductibility of some but not all of the major
sources of state revenue might substantially diminish the options
of the states in structuring their revenue raising programs. Con-
cern with this danger motivated Congress in 1964, as well as a
recent ABA study commission, to reject suggestions that the sec-
tion 164 deduction be severely limited.1 0 7
In order to determine the role of the deduction for state and
local taxes in our federal system, a survey was taken of state tax
commissioners in all fifty states.' 0 8  The questionnaire sent to
these individuals concerned the role of section 164 in the formu-
lation of state revenue policy. The survey demonstrates that a sig-
nificant majority of the states consider the issue of deductibility in
shaping their tax system.'0 9 In addition, the survey reveals that
the impact of section 164 on the states varies considerably. In
slightly more than a majority of the states it has facilitated tax
increases." 0 On the other hand, in slightly less than a majority
of the states, section 164 motivated legislatures to employ deduc-
tible taxes rather than nondeductible taxes or user fees."' Al-
107 See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra. A recent ABA committee has reached
the conclusion reached by Congress in 1964: that the deduction for state and local income
taxes is required to assure that only income is taxed, and that preservation of the deduc-
tion for sales and property taxes is therefore essential to insure that our tax laws afford the
states and localities freedom to structure their revenue raising systems. See ABA Special
Comm. on Simplification, Evaluation of the Proposed Model Comprehensive Income Tax,
32 TAx. LAw. 563, 653 (1979).
108 The survey consisted of eight statements, and it requested the commissioners to indi-
cate whether they strongly agreed, agreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed, with the state-
ments. The rate of response was surprisingly high-49 of 50 commissioners participated;
45 questionnaires were usable. The results of the survey are on file at the Cornell Law
Review and available on request.
109 The statement read: (1) "In shaping its tax system your state legislature has consid-
ered the fact that certain taxes only (income, sales and property) are deductible for fed-
eral income tax purposes."
Three of the 45 respondents indicated that they strongly agreed with this statement,
30 agreed with it, and 12 disagreed with it.
110 Twenty-four respondents agreed, 19 disagreed and 2 strongly disagreed with the
following statement: "The deduction for state and local taxes provided by the Internal
Revenue Code has in the past made it easier, than otherwise would have been the case, for
your state legislature and local government units to vote new deductible taxes or raise rates
on existing deductible taxes."
1I In response to the statement, "The deduction for state and local taxes provided by
the Code has resulted in the use in your state of deductible taxes in preference to non-
deductible user fees," 1 commissioner strongly agreed, 18 agreed, 23 disagreed, and 3
strongly disagreed. In response to the statement, "The deduction for state and local taxes
provided by the Code has resulted in the use in your state of deductible taxes in prefer-
ence to nondeductible taxes," 20 commissioners agreed, 21 disagreed, 2 strongly disagreed,
and 2 offered no opinion.
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though deductibility has a significant impact in shaping some fea-
tures of the states' tax system, it has little impact in other areas.
This lack of impact stems from political considerations. For
example, in a significant majority of the states, deductibility has
not persuaded legislatures to shift the tax burden from lower-
income taxpayers to higher-income ones, on whom the after-tax
burden is less. 1 2  Moreover, removing the deduction for the sales
tax would probably not result in a significant shift from the sales
tax to the income tax." 3
Despite differences of opinion with respect to the impact of
section 164 on their individual states, the commissioners surveyed
overwhelmingly agreed on two points. First, most respondents in-
dicated that a proposal to repeal section 164 would be a matter of
significant concern in state houses and city halls. 14  Second, they
indicated that allowing a deduction for the principal sources of
state and local revenue, thereby according to the states considera-
ble freedom to shape their revenue systems, is desirable in a fed-
eral system." 5 In evaluating the role of section 164 in our system
of fiscal federalism, one can conclude that although the deduction
112 The questionnaire posed this statement: "The system of deductibility of state and
local taxes has encouraged the shifting, by your legislature, of state taxes away from lower
bracket taxpayers, to upper bracket taxpayers, because deductions are more valuable to
upper bracket taxpayers." Only 11 of the respondents agreed with this statement; 23 dis-
agreed, 10 strongly disagreed, and I did not respond.
Undeniably, the effectiveness of high income groups in the electoral process has much
to do with these results. The percentage of eligible voters who participate in the electoral
process bears a direct relationship to their income levels. For example, in the 1968 presi-
dential election only 54% of eligible voters with a family income below $3,000 voted,
whereas 84% of those with family incomes exceeding $15,000 voted. See R. SCANMMON &
B. WATTENBERG, THE REAL MAJORITY 54 (1970). In view of the fact that wealthy people
contribute disproportionately to political campaigns, it is not surprising that our tax laws
reflect their interests. See, e.g., D. ADAMANY, FINANCING POLITICS (1969); H. ALEXANDER,
MONEY IN POLITICS (1972).
113 In response to the statement, "Removal of the sales tax from the list of deductible
taxes would probably cause your legislature to shift away from the sales tax toward the
income tax," only 9 of the commissioners agreed, 23 disagreed, 10 strongly disagreed, and
3 did not respond. These responses indicate that factors other than deductibility play a
large role in a state's decision to employ a sales tax.
"1 The statement read as follows: "A proposal to reveal the deduction for state and
local taxes would be a matter of significant concern to state and local governmental figures
in your state." Twenty-three of those responding strongly agreed, 14 agreed, 7 disagreed,
and I expressed no opinion. The intensity of response to this question reveals that a move
to repeal § 164 is unlikely to succeed in the near future.
115 In response to the statement, "The present policy of allowing a deduction for the
principal sources of state and local revenue (income, sales and property taxes), thereby
according the states considerable freedom to shape their revenue system as they wish, is
desirable in a federal system," 7 of the respondents strongly agreed, 34 agreed, 3 disa-
greed, and I expressed no opinion.
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for state and local taxes has facilitated the raising of revenue in
many states, repealing the deductibility of one of the taxes would
not result in a major restructuring of state tax systems. However,
state officials view deductions for all major sources of state rev-
enue as an important, if symbolic, acknowledgment to state
sovereignty. Moreover, the states' interests in preserving the de-
duction is significant enough to make its repeal at present most
unlikely.
In determining whether to adjust the tax base to promote
fundamental values of society, analysts must consider the impact
of a deduction on the tax base, and then weigh this impact against
both the availability and cost of alternative programs and the
negative effect on fundamental values resulting from a failure to
adjust the tax base.
The tax expenditure budget (TEB) sheds light on the finan-
cial impact of tax base erosions. In general, the TEB is a listing,
although somewhat incomplete, of special treatment accorded cer-
tain types of income or expenditures which result in an erosion of
the tax base. l l6 The TEB estimates the revenue lost from each
item on the list, on the assumption that all other items will be left
intact.1 17  The most recent TEB estimated that the deduction for
real property taxes on personal residences would result in lost rev-
enues in fiscal year 1979-1980 of $6,615,000,000, and that the
deduction for all other taxes would result in a revenue loss of
11 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 1, at 183-211.
117 One can criticize the TEB on four separate grounds. First, the measure of foregone
revenue implicitly assumes zero elasticities. For example, repeal of the capital gains deduc-
tion would not produce the lost revenue shown in the TEB because repeal would likely
have a chilling impact on sales of capital assets. Second, the TEB ignores the impact of
"direct" spending programs substituted by the government on private spending in an area.
For example, some economists have speculated that additional government spending on
charitable activities may actually squeeze out private spending in that area. Third, the TEB,
it is alleged, assumes that the natural tax base is "income." However, serious economic
policy considerations may merit special treatment of an item, such as medical expenses. See
generally Stiglitz & Boskin, supra note 95, at 298-307 and authorities cited therein. Finally,
curious anomalies in the list of items included in the TEB, as well as items excluded, cast
doubt on the Treasury's definition of income and what standards the Treasury employed
to determine what particular items to include in the TEB. For example, although the TEB
includes some nonrecognition transactions, such as the roll-over of gain on sale of a per-
sonal residence (which results in a relatively minor loss of revenue), it excludes others, such
as the nonrecognition treatment of corporate reorganizations that results in an enormous
revenue loss. Similarly, although the TEB includes the favorable treatment accorded to
certain categories of income, such as capital gains and personal service income, under the
maximum tax on earned income it ignores the favorable treatment accorded earned in-
come under the zero bracket amount by § 63(e)(2). See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, supra note 1, at 208-11.
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$12,450,000,000 during the same period. 118 Unfortunately, there
is no way of breaking down the latter figure into income, sales,
and personal and other real property taxes. It is clear, however,
that section 164 is a costly way of accommodating the income tax
to the interests of the states in a federal system.
Congress might consider replacing the deduction for state
and local taxes with either a tax credit or a direct spending pro-
gram, such as an enhanced revenue sharing program, as an alter-
native means of supporting fiscal federalism. Credits may be
superior to deductions because they are more equitable-the ben-
efit to the taxpayer would not depend on his tax rate. 11 9 Prob-
lems with using a credit stem from two sources. First, because the
strength of various economic groups is proportionate to their in-
come levels,' 20 if Congress set the credit at a level that would give
the states as much indirect political support to impose tax in-
creases as the present system of deductions provides, it would
probably have to allow a credit so high that the revenue lost
would exceed that lost under the current system. Second, if Con-
gress concluded that at least one of the taxes should remain de-
ductible, it would probably be difficult to design a politically-
neutral combined deduction-credit mechanism, unless it again set
the credit for the nondeductible taxes at such a high level that the
loss in revenue would exceed the amount presently lost.
Although it has some advantages over a credit program, a
direct spending alternative, such as a grant-in-aid or a revenue
sharing program, also presents special problems. Such a scheme
would further exacerbate the weaknesses of the states and their
dependence on the central government. Recent threats and pro-
posals to cut back on revenue sharing and grant-in-aid programs
adequately illustrate this point.' 2 '
An alternative approach is to allow individual states to elect
whether their state and local taxes should remain deductible.
118 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 1, at 208-11.
119 See generally S. SURREY, supra note 1.
120 See note 112 supra.
121 Political difficulties also inhere in any attempt to modify the present levels of these
programs. See, e.g., States Get New Warning of Cuts in Funds Under A Balanced Budget, N. Y.
Times, Feb. 19, 1979, § 4, at 8, col. 2; Budget Balances Warned by Muskie, id., Feb. 14, 1979,
§ 1, at 17, col. 1; Carter Trims Plans on Funds for Cities, id., Jan. 4, 1979, § 1 at 13, col. 6;
Carter Weighs Pushing States to Assist Cities, id., Feb. 12, 1978, § 1, at 1, col. 5. Divisive
regional conflicts result from direct spending programs undertaken by Congress for the
benefit of the states. See South and West Joining Forces in Hope of Outvoting Northeast in Con-
gress, id., April 5, 1979, § 2 at 13, col. 1.
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States electing nondeductibility (as well as localities within those
states) would then become beneficiaries of block grants calculated
as a percentage of state and local tax receipts from otherwise de-
ductible taxes. The states could use these funds to finance tax cuts
or new spending programs. The percentage used to determine
the amount of the block grants could be set at a level that would
insure that the funds going to electing states equaled the new rev-
enue received by the federal government by the repeal of the
deductibility of state and local taxes. A provision allowing revoca-
tion by the states would be an adequate guard against termination
of the grant system by the federal government. Such a system
would entail a variety of administrative problems, but none would
prove insurmountable. Consideration of the impact of such a
program on the efficiency of the tax system is essential. Neverthe-
less, it is likely that the added savings in compliance and adminis-
tration costs to the taxpayers, who would no longer itemize, and to
the government, which would not have to audit as many returns,
would exceed the new administration and compliance costs to the
government.
Congress would have to determine whether any exception
should be allowed for the income tax because its deductibility is
theoretically well-grounded. Congress might establish such a
program for the sales and property taxes, while allowing the in-
come tax to remain deductible. Moreover, because participation in
the program would be voluntary, and states could use the funds
to finance various programs -whether selective tax cuts or new
social programs-it is clear that a block grant election program
better preserves the fiscal neutrality in our federal system.
Section 164 has played a modest, but by no means dominant,
role in shaping the revenue raising systems of the states. How-
ever, the symbolic role of section 164 in our system of fiscal
federalism is so great that in the absence of a satisfactory alterna-
tive, such as a block grant election program, total or partial repeal
of section 164 is probably ill-advised from both a theoretical and
practical point of view.
V
COMPOSITE ANALYSIS OF THE DEDUCTION
FOR STATE AND LOCAL TAXES
Because each of the three tiers in the proposed mode of
analysis is of equal weight, it is necessary to balance them in
determining whether personal deductions are warranted. This
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composite analysis is applied here to the deduction for state and
local taxes provided by section 164.
Personal deductions exempt from taxation expenditures or
losses that do not constitute consumption; receipts, so adjusted,
equal income. The deduction for state and local income taxes rep-
resents such an essential adjustment. On the other hand, the
deduction for state and local gasoline taxes is an example of a de-
duction that was unwarranted: these expenditures constituted
consumption. The deductions for state and local sales and prop-
erty taxes are not easily categorized. Although such taxes repre-
sent funds that are not consumed by the taxpayer, but rather by
the general public, they are arguably incidents of consumption. As
such, they are similar to many other taxes that are indirectly
borne by consumers. Consequently, it is inappropriate to permit
the deduction of sales and property taxes simply because of their
direct nature, although in the absence of other significant consid-
erations, a line may perhaps just as reasonably be drawn between
direct and indirect taxes as between state and local income taxes
and all other state and local taxes.
Considering the principal reasons for adopting and maintain-
ing an income tax system, one recognizes the need to insure that
our tax structure is geared toward an individual's ability to pay.
As a result, the involuntary nature of state and local income taxes
makes them ideal candidates for deduction. Both property and
sales taxes are involuntary only to the extent they are imposed on
true essentials; therefore the deductibility of a vast majority of
these taxes cannot be justified on the ground that they impair
one's ability to pay. The small percentage of sales and property
taxes that should be deductible on such grounds is probably
adequately covered by the present personal exemptions, depen-
dent deductions, and the zero bracket amount. Although at least
two other reasons support an income tax-its role as an economic
stabilizer and its capacity to raise substantial amounts of revenue
in an efficient fashion-neither suggests that a further erosion of
the tax base is required to accommodate the base to these consid-
erations. A deduction for income, sales, and property taxes does
not present substantial administrative and compliance burdens
and their continued deductibility cannot be rejected on that
ground. Moreover, the continued deductibility of these taxes
probably has a ,mild positive impact on the role of the income tax
as an economic stabilizer.
Considering the role of section 164 in a federal system, one
must conclude that complete repeal of section 164 would produce
[Vol. 66:262
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a neutral environment in which the states could shape their legis-
lative programs. However, because the existence of section 164
facilitates the states' revenue raising efforts, repeal would proba-
bly impair the ability of a number of states to fund programs
adequately, thus placing more of the burden of funding programs
on the federal government. Partial repeal of the deduction would
render some of the states' principal sources of revenue nondeduct-
ible and others deductible. Arguably, states should not be subject
to this indirect form of pressure in determining the composition
of their revenue raising programs. However, because, as the sur-
vey revealed, repeal of the sales tax deduction would probably not
produce a significant shift away from this tax toward the income
tax, this consideration may merit little weight.'22 Nonetheless,
strong state feelings on the issue of deductibility indicate that
some accommodation must be made to the revenue programs of
the states, such as enlarging the revenue sharing program, sub-
stituting a tax credit for existing deductible taxes, or instituting a
block grant-deduction election program.
.After weighing the above competing considerations, this au-
thor suggests retaining the deduction for state and local income
taxes. Moreover, because it is unclear whether the state sales and
property taxes represent nonconsumption expenditures, and be-
cause state finances would be adversely affected if the taxes were
repealed, one might conclude that the deduction for sales and
property taxes should continue. Ultimate resolution of that issue,
however, should hinge on whether another adequate accommoda-
tion to the revenue interests of the states can be found. If such an
accommodation exists, repeal of the deduction for either the sales
or property taxes would probably be desirable. Unless Congress
can fashion such an accommodation, however, retaining the de-
duction in its present form is probably a political reality. 123
122 The widespread use of the sales tax and the relatively small amount it constitutes as
a personal deduction make it the most likely candidate for congressional repeal. The sales
and retailer taxes are so widespread that only three states, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho,
do not currently employ either tax. See [1979] ALL STATES TAX REPORTER (P-H) § 101.
123 The system of analysis advocated in this Article should not be viewed as a device for
defending the status quo of personal deductions. The deduction for interest on other than
investment property, for example, is probably totally indefensible on theoretical grounds.
The fact that many of the other personal deductions are theoretically justifiable most likely
indicates that they represent serious attempts by Congress to conform the tax system to an
accepted set of ideals. Congress is aware of the special status of many of these deductions.
For example, the deductions for state and local taxes, medical expenses, and casualty losses
are included in the group of itemized deductions that do not give rise to tax preferences.
See I.R.C. § 57 (b).
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CONCLUSION
In recent years proponents of both the tax expenditure
budget and the comprehensive tax base have advocated the elimi-
nation of almost all personal deductions. Most of these critics
characterize personal deductions as subsidies for the wealthy that
violate basic precepts of horizontal and vertical equity. Most of the
writing in the field of basic tax theory has failed to take adequate
account of the diverse functions that personal deductions can
legitimately perform in a tax system.
Ideally, personal deductions perform three basic roles. First,
they provide a means of adjusting receipts so that the tax base is
equal to the taxpayer's income. For any expenditure to qualify as
a deduction under this rationale it must be primarily noncon-
sumptive. The definition of consumption to be employed in mak-
ing this determination should encompass actions that involve a
removal of assets from society's scarce pool of resources, and a
use of those assets to produce a private benefit. Second, where
taxation of the income base is inconsistent with the societal prime
rationales for an income tax system, the bases should be adjusted.
Personal deductions provide a means for realizing this goal.
Third, where taxation of a particular base will produce results in-
consistent with a society's fundamental social, economic, and polit-
ical values, the base should be adjusted to produce a result in
harmony with those values. Personal deductions are a means of
accomplishing this goal. Because none of the above three func-
tions can appropriately be deemed primary or controlling, a deci-
sion about the validity of various personal deductions can be
made only after balancing all the factors involved.
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